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DIVORCE AND FEDERAL TAXES
DANIEL F. PARISER"
S OCIOLOGICAL aspects of the great national increase
in the divorce rate have been dealt with in many pub-
lications. The economic result to the parties involved in
divorce proceedings is of more immediate consequence to
the practicing attorney. The following is a guide to some
of the economic changes caused the individual involved by
Virtue of the Federal taxing statutes and their application.'
The INTERNAL REVENUE CODE contains three important
provisions dealing with alimony and divorce settlements.2
Section 22 (k) includes in the gross income of the wife
separated or divorced under a decree of separation or di-
vorce:
"periodic payments . . . received subsequent to such
decree in discharge of . . . a legal 6bligation which, be-
cause of the marital or family relationship, is imposed
upon . . . such husband under such decree or under a
written instrument incident to such divorce or separa-
tion."3
Section 22 (k) also includes such payments attributable
to property transferred (in trust or otherwise) in dis-
charge of the legal obligation. It excludes from wife's gross
income any amount fixed as support for minor children.
Further, where the total amount to be paid is a fixed sum,
* B. A. Princeton University, 1939; LL.B. Harvard University, 1946;
member of Dade County Bar, Florida Bar, and Pennsylvania Bar.
I Even persons in the lower income brackets have tax problems arising
out of divorce decrees. An employed husband must file a new withholding
exemption certificate within ten days after entry of the decree-Reg. 116
Sec. 405.206 (as amended by T. D. 5492, Jan. 30, 1946). If self-employed,
an amended declaration of estimated tax must be made on Form 1040
ES-Reg. III Sec. 29. 58-7 (F); the time of filing varies depending upon
which quarter of the fiscal year the decree is entered. If minor children
are involved, the exemption goes to the parent contributing the most
towards support.
21.R.C. Sections 22 (k), 23 (u), and 171.
3 I.R.C. 22 (k); Reg. III Sec. 29.22 (k)-1.
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installment payments of this sum are considered "periodic
payments" and includible in the wife's income only if the
total amount may be paid over a period of ten years or
more, and then only, in any one year, to the extent of 10%
of the principal sum.
4
The other side of the coin is section 23 (u), which allows
the husband to deduct from his gross income:
" . . . amounts includible under section 22 (k) in the
gross income of his wife, payment of which is made within
the husband's taxable year."5
There have been sufficient decisions under these sec-
tions to allow some positive interpretation:
First, there must be a decree of support or legal separa-
tion. Payments under a voluntary separation agreement
are not covered.6 Payments made under an order of separ-
ate maintenance, or under an annulment decree, are not
included, where there is no legal separation.7 And where
a prior agreement is included in a decree nunc pro tunc to
the date of the agreement, the Tax Court has refused to
consider payments actually made between the date of the
agreement and date of entry of the decree as being covered
by these sections.- It is clear that this part of section 22
(k) has been rigidly interpreted.
The word "payments" is apparently restricted to a trans-
fer of cash or its equivalent. Where a wife was awarded
permanent occupancy of a home, the husband could not
deduct the yearly rental value as a "payment." 9
Where the agreement or decree is indefinite as to the
amount allocated to support of children, but it is clear from
the terms thereof that payments are intended to cover
such support as well as alimony, then the-overnment has
to date advanced the position that all is included in the
wife's gross income. 0 This, indeed, would seem to follow
4 Supra note 3, as to the date from which 10 years are counted, see
Tillie Blum, 10 T. C.-(No. 59).
5 I.R.C. 23 (u); Reg. III Sec. 29.23 (u-1).
6 Charles L. Brown, 7 T.C. 715.
7 Frank J. K4 lchthaler, 7 T.C. 625.
s Robert L. Daime, 9 T.C ......... (No. 4).
9 Pappenheimer v. Allen, 71 F. Supp. 788 (D.C. Ga., 1947).
10 Dora H. Moitoret, 7 T.C. 640.
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from a literal reading of the statute. However, it is not
difficult to imagine the Bureau of Internal Revenue taking
a different stand when the government might profit there-
by.
The difference between "periodic payments" and "in-
stallment payments of a principal sum" has given rise to
some litigation. Even though installment payments of a
fixed sum cease upon remarriage, a "principal sum" is
nevertheless involved and the payments are not deductible.1'
But where the period was fixed at fifty months, and the
amount of payment was to be fixed by the husband's an-
nual income, no "principal sum" is involved and payments
are deductible by the husband.1 2 The logical difficulty in
reconciling these two decisions is the fact that in each case
the total amount to be paid is dependent upon future
events.
Where a divorced wife is paid the income from a trust,
whether the trust was established incident to the divorce
or not, the income so paid is included in her gross income
and excluded from the gross income of the husband, even
if it would otherwise have been included in his income. 13
The amount so paid is deductible from the gross income of
the estate or trust.' 4 This allows the estate of a deceased
husband to deduct from income the amounts paid a divorced
wife under a decree requiring husband or his estate to
support the wife for life. 5
In the unusual event that the wife pays alimony, the
above discussion is nevertheless applicable.' 6
It is clear that lump sum payments under a divorce de-
cree are not deductible by the husband or income to the
wife." However, such settlements have income tax aspects
when payment is in property. If the cost basis of the prop-
erty to the husband is $10,000 and the decree calls for a
$15,000 payment to the wife, the transfer of this property
11 J. B, Steine, 10 T.C ......... (No. 52).
12 Roland K. Young, 10 T.C ......... (No. 96).
13I.R.C. 171 (a).
141.R.C. 171 (b),
15 Laughlin's Estate v. Comm., 167 F. 2d 828 (CC.A. 9th 1948).
16.R.C. 3797 (a).
17 Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151; Reg. III Sec. 29.22 (k-i).
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results in the husband realizing a $5,000 capital gain."
Also, if the fair market value at the time of transfer is
only $12,000, and the wife later sells it for $12,000, she
realizes a $3,000 capital loss since the value the parties
ascribe to the property at the time of transfer is governing,
not the fair market value.'9
As important in many cases as the income tax aspect of
such lump sum settlements are the unavoidable encounters
with the Federal gift tax. Here we also find a realm of
real danger to the client. There is no specific gift tax pro-
vision in the I. R. C. covering this situation, but the general
provisions of the gift tax sections have been applied in many
of these situations.
20
The general rule is that, in order not to constitute a gift,
the transfer of property must be for an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth." In one of the
earlier cases, the parties agreed before commencement of
divorce proceedings, that H would, after obtaining a di-
vorce, convey certain property to W in complete settlement
of marital rights.2  After procuring a divorce, H conveyed
as he had agreed. The government's attempt to claim a gift
tax was denied, a full consideration being found.2
But because of the repeated attempts of the Bureau to
impose a tax on these transfers, and because certain doubts
were raised by Supreme Court cases imposing a tax on
certain antenuptial transfers, ' the Estate Tax division
tried to clarify the situation by laying down the following
rules:
1. Release of support rights may constitute con-
is Commissioner v. Hailiwell, 131 F. 2d 642 (C.C.A. 2d 1942);
Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F. 2d 986 (C.C.A. 3d 1941).
l 9Aleda N. Hall, 9 T. ..... (No. 5).
20 I.R.C. Sections 1000, 1001, 1002, and 1003.
21 I.R.C. 1002.
22 Herbert Jones, 1 T.C. 1207.
23 See also to same effect: Clarence B. Mitchell, 6 T.C. 159; Matthew
Lahti, 6 T.C 7; Lewis Cass Ledyard, 3d, 1946 Prentice Hall Tax Court
Memo Decisions, No. 46071.
24 Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U. S. 303.
19481
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sideration in money or money's worth.
2. Bureau will determine the reasonable value of
support and maintenance rights, and only the excess
will be taxed.
3. Release of dower or inheritance rights is not
consideration in money or money's worth.
4. The Bureau will make a reasonable allocation in
the absence of such an allocation by the parties.
5. Payment by the husband of wife's counsel fees
is not a gift to extent that husband is under obliga-
tion.25
One more attack by the government, following this state-
ment of position, was attempted when an agreement of
settlement prior to the divorce was approved and incor..
porated in the decree. Under the agreement, the husband
transferred $586,000. The Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue, using life expectancy tables, claimed that the true
value of support rights was only $306,630, and that the
excess constituted a gift. This position was rejected.2
One recent decision, however, appears to hold that a
lump sum settlement agreement subsequently adopted and
ratified by a divorce decree may nevertheless be taxable as
a gift if the agreement does not specifically state it is in
release of "support" rights.27 This may prove a future pit-
fall for the unwary.
In any case involving lump sum settlements, the above
principles announced by the Estate Tax division should be
carefully considered.
The problem of estate taxes must be considered where the
estate of the husband is by the terms of the decree liable for
continued support of the wife. If the personal representa-
tive, wishing to close the estate, settles all future claims
with the wife, he may, under I. R. C. 812 (b) deduct from
the gross estate the commuted value of future payments as
24 Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U. S. 303; Merrill v. Fahs, 324
U. s. 308,
25 E.T, 19; 1946--16--12367.
26 Estate of Frank W. Gould, 1947 Prentice Hall Tax Court Memo
Decisions No. 47,176.
27 Clarissa H. Thompson, 1947, Prentice Hall Tax Court Memo Deci-
sions No. 47,194.
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determined by the Commissioner." This settlement amount
or a formula therefor, should be provided for in the decree,
since otherwise the Commissioner's determination of the
value of future payments may be less than the wife is will-
ing to settle for, and thus part of the payment will not be
deductible.
This guide to the present Federal tax status of alimony
decrees and lump sum settlements is of course inapplicable
in the event pertinent sections of the Internal Revenue
Code are revised.
28 Commissioner v. Maresi, 156 F. 2d 929 (C.C.A. 2d 1946).
